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BEATING A POTENTIAL DEATHTRAP: HOW TO PRESERVE THE APPELLATE
RECORD FOR FEDERAL REVIEW AND AVOID VIRGINIA'S PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
BY: KRISTOPHER E. AHREND
This article discusses the potential "deathtrap" facing capital appellants in the Commonwealth, created by the Supreme Court of Virginia's
Rules 5:261 and 5:17(c). 2 It suggests what steps should be taken at direct
appeal to be excepted from these procedural requirements and the federal
grounds upon which objections to their enforcement should be made in
order to successfully preserve those objections for subsequent federal
habeas review. The purpose of offering these suggestions is to prevent
capital appellants from being denied federal review of constitutional
claims on the basis of procedural default created by the application of
these two Virginia rules.
I. PROCEDURAL DEFAULT AS DEFINED BY
VIRGINIA RULES 5:26 AND 5:17(c): THE TWO
COMPONENTS OF "THE DEATHTRAP"
The first component of Virginia's "deathtrap" is Supreme Court
Rule 5:26, which provides that all briefs submitted to an appellate court
must be limited to fifty pages in length, unless the court, in its discretion,
permits otherwise.3 By limiting the amount of space in which a capital
appellant may argue assignments of error, the rule effectively limits the
number ofissues that may be raised, regardless of their merit. Though the
court does have discretion to hear additional claims that do not comport
with these requirements, it has rarely done so. 4 Therefore, for all
practical purposes, any arguments that counsel wishes to raise must be
contained within a fifty page brief.

I Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:26 (1995).
2 Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:17(e) (1995).

3 "Except by permission of a justice of this Court, neither the
opening brief of appellant, nor the brief of appellee, nor a brief amicus
curiae shall exceed 50 pages typed or 36 printed pages." Va. Sup. Ct. R.
5:26(a) (1995).
4 It is difficult, if not impossible to know how many times relief
from the page limit was granted since discussion of such relief would
probably not appear in a reported case. However, it is the beliefof at least
one member of the Commonwealth bar that such relief is sometimes
granted. Telephone Interview with Mr. Daniel Morrisette, Esq., Defense
Counsel in Weeks v. Commonwealth, by Mr. Greg Weinig, Associate
Resource Editor, Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse.
5 Rule 17(c) actually presents two dangers to capital appellants.
Under section (c), issues of error not assigned in the appellate brief will
be defaulted. Additionally, under section (c)(4), issues assigned, but not
fully briefed and argued will also be defaulted. While the discussion of
the "deathtrap," and the line of cases cited infra note 7, deal with
situations where issues were not fully briefed, there are technically two
ways that the Supreme Court of Virginia can default issues not raised in
the appellate brief.
6 239 Va. 534, 391 S.E.2d 276 (1990).
7 In Savino the court dismissed two of the defendant's claims on the
grounds that they were not raised at trial, violating Supreme Court Rule
5:25, and were not fully argued in the appellant brief, violating Rule
5:27(e). At the time, Rule 5:27(e) required that appellant's opening brief
contain"tlhe principles oflaw, the argument, and the authorities relating
to each question presented." Subsequently, Rule 5:27 was rewritten and
amended effective January 1, 1993. The provision cited in Savino,

The second component of the "deathtrap" is established by Supreme Court Rule 17(c), which requires that all issues presented to the
appellate court mustbe assigned, fully briefed and argued in the appellate
brief.5 Any issue not assigned or completely briefed may be defaulted.
Thus, again, meritorious and potentially life-saving arguments defaulted
under this rule may be lost unless counsel adheres to these requirements.
Beginning with Savino v. Commonwealth,6 the Supreme Court has
strictly enforced the proposition that issues not raised and briefed to the
appellate court will be defaulted Several subsequent capital cases have
8
reaffirmed the court's holding in Savino.
Initially, the constraints imposed by these rules would seem to have
little effect on the appellate practices of counsel. According to traditional
principles of appellate advocacy, when writing an appellate brief, counsel should narrow the scope of issues presented to the court, presenting
only those issues that counsel believes have the best chance of being
resolved in their favor. 9 By presenting only the strongest issues, counsel
can best ensure that those issues Will be clearly addressed by the appellate
court. 10 Therefore, rules limiting the size of appellate briefs are ordinarily not burdensome since traditional appellate practice already counsels attorneys to limit the size and content of their briefs.
However, while legitimate in other areas of appellate practice, this
strategy of winnowing issues is not applicable to a capital appeal. In a
capital case, omitting potentially meritorious claims can literally mean
the difference between life and death. 11 The practicing bar has recognized that in capital cases, counsel should present any and all arguably

requiring appellants to fully argue all issues of error in the appellant brief,
was relocated to amended Rule 5:17(c)(4). Since these amendments, the
Supreme Court of Virginiahas not explicitly cited amended Rule 5:17(c)
as authority for defaulting claims of error not fully briefed on appeal.
Rather, the court has simply cited the most recent case in the line that
began with Savino.
8 See, e.g., Weeks v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 460,450 S.E. 2d 379
(1994); Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 451, 423 S.E.2d 360,
364 (1992); Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 370, 402
S.E.2d 218 (1991); Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 240, 397
S.E.2d 385 (1990); Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26,41,393 S.E.2d
599 (1990).
9 SeeJonesv.Barnes,463 U.S. 745,751-53 (1983) (explaining that
"[e]xperienced advocates since time beyond memory have emphasized
the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and
focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most a few key issues");
accord Turnerv. Williams, 812 F.Supp. 1400, 1416-17 (E.D.Va. 1993)
(citing Jones forproposition that counsel's failure to raise certain claims
upon direct appeal of capital sentence was not ineffective assistance of
counsel since counsel could choose to omit these claims if they believed
doing so was in client's best interest).
10 Jones, 463 U.S. at 751-53.
11 "Every issue must be raised in a capital case, no matter how
hopeless at the time. Winnowing out weaker arguments can have ... fatal
consequences." Stephen B. Bright, Death by Lottery-ProceduralBar
of ConstitutionalClaims in CapitalTrialsDue to InadequateRepresentation of Incompetent Defendants, 92 W. Va. L. Rev. 679, 688 n.47
(1990).
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meritorious issues when perfecting an appeal. 12 This strategy is essential, not only to ensure the review of all issues on direct appeal, but more
importantly, to ensure the preservation of these issues forreview in future
federal habeas proceedings. The effect of Virginia's "deathtrap" is to
prevent counsel from presenting all potentially meritorious issues to the
court on direct appeal. 13 Once defaulted at direct appeal, these issues
will be precluded from review during federal habeas proceedings as well.
Most significantly, because any one of the issues defaulted may have
presented valid grounds for relief, the Virginia rules limit the defendant's
ability to contest a wrongful conviction or execution. This is Virginia's
"deathtrap."
IT.THE "DEATHTRAP" AT WORK

appellate brief simply by referring to the trial court record. This "incorporation by reference" technique would allow additional claims to be
raised at appeal without using up valuable space in the appellate brief.
Unfortunately, this strategy has been foreclosed by a second line of
recent Supreme Court of Virginia decisions. Beginning with Spencer v.
Commonwealth16 and Jenkinsv. Commonwealth,17 the court has denied
attempts to "incorporate by reference" arguments raised at trial or other
prior proceedings. 18 More recent decisions suggest that the court will
continue to deny the use of incorporation, 19 interpreting Rule 5:17(c) to
require that all appellate arguments to be raised and fully briefed in the
appellate brief.
]I. WHAT SHOULD ATTORNEYS DO?

Together, then, Rules 5:26 and 5:17(c) force capital appellants to
fully argue any issues they wish to preserve within the confines of a fifty
page brief. This limits the ability of capital appellants to present and
preserve all potentially life-saving claims. Forced to adhere to a traditional appellate strategy, defense counsel must choose those arguments
that they believe have the best chance of being favorably resolved and
default all others not briefed.
It is essentially impossible for an attorney to make such a choice.
The law of capital punishment is perhaps the most unpredictable of any
modem area of the law. In several instances, the United States Supreme
Court has reversed or struck down major components of state capital
punishment systems, sometimes invalidating a statutory scheme that it
had previously found permissible. 14 In such instances, where defendants
effectively preserved seemingly "losing" issues, their death sentences
were set aside. For those defendants who failed to preserve these issues,
15
the courts provided no such relief, leaving them to be executed.
Until recently, there appeared to be a way in which defense counsel
could avoid default underRule 17(c) while still adhering to the fifty page
limit imposed by Rule 5:26. In every direct appeal from a capital sentence
in the Commonwealth, the trial record is admitted into the appellate
record so that it may be reviewed by the Supreme Court. That record
contains all objections and supporting briefs submitted and fully argued
before the trial court. Thus, where counsel intended to reassert the same
errors and arguments, it appeared possible to incorporate them into the

These recent holdings by the Supreme Court of Virginia suggest
that Virginia's "deathtrap" will continue to threaten capital defendants
seeking to appeal their convictions and sentences. However, there are
steps that defendants can take in order to avoid this trap and challenge the
Court's enforcement of Rules 5:17(c) and 5:26. Foremost, on direct
appeal counsel should request relief from the 50 page brief limit if at all
necessary. Because the decision to enforce the fifty page limit is within
20
the court's discretion, this requirement may be waived.
Should that motion be denied, counsel should move the court to
reconsider the initial motion for relief. At that point, counsel should
identify every potential claim she would brief and argue were she not
limited by the Virginia Rules. Counsel must identify the particular
constitutional grounds for each ofthe claims being raised, as well as any
other applicable state authority. If relief from the fifty page limit is
denied, but the record reflects the claims affected by the denial, both
those specific claims and the challenges to the constitutionality of Rules
17(c) and 26, may be effectively preserved for federal habeas review.

12 "Appellate counsel should seek, when perfecting the [capital]
appeal, to present all arguably meritorious issues, including challenges
to any overly restrictive appellate rules . . . ." Standardsfor the
Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, §
11.9.2(d) (National Legal Aid and Defender Association)(1988). See §
11.9.2 (Commentary) (distinguishing this duty from that explicitly
described by the Court inJonesv.Barnes,463 U.S. 745,746 (1983)); see
also Turnerv. Williams, 812 F.Supp. at 1416 (stating that "[f]or judges
to second-guess reasonable professional judgements ... would disserve
the very goal of vigorous and effective advocacy .... ) In permitting
counsel to omit claims during appellate proceedings, the court stressed
the importance of respecting counsel's professional judgment in trying
a case. See supranote 7. It would follow then, that in the capital context,
courts should not enact or uphold procedural rules that prevent counsel
from pursuing additional issues either if counsel believed that the
pursuit of such claims was necessary in order to adequately represent
their client.
13 See Bright at 683 (stating "[i]n Wainwrightv. Sykes [433 U.S. 72,
84-87 (1977)], [the Supreme Court held that] meritorious constitutional
claims may be barred from federal review because of an attorney's failure
to satisfy state procedural rules").
14
See, e.g., Pohl & TumerIfAtFirstYouDon't Succeed: TheReal
andPotentialImpact of Simmons v. South Carolina in Virginia,Capital

Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 28 (1994) (noting Supreme Court in
Simmons overruled previous holding of Virginia Supreme Court regarding admissibility of parole ineligibility information for capital defendants); Penryv.Lynaugh,492 U.S. 302 (1989) (finding the consideration
of mitigating evidence in the Texas capital scheme to be constitutionally
inadequate despite its earlier approval in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976)).
15 Pohl & Turner, supra note 14, at 28 (noting defendant in Smitli
v. Murray,477 U.S. 527 (1986), failed to raise objection to claim nol
accepted by Virginia Supreme Court, only to have Supreme Cour
subsequently decide issue in his favor). See also Bright, supra note 11
at 685 (describing cases of codefendants, one of whom was spared dead
because attorney preserved seemingly worthless claim, while other wa,
executed, because his attorney did not preserve that same claim).
16 240 Va. 78, 393 S.E.2d 609 (1990).
17 244 Va. 445, 423 S.E.2d 360 (1992).
18 Jenkins, 244 Va. at 460,423 S.E.2d at 370; Spencer, 240 Va. a
99, 393 S.E.2d at 622.
19 See, e.g., Mickens v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 395, 401, 44,
S.E.2d 678,683 (1994); Williams v. Commonwealth 248 Va. 528,537
450 S.E.2d 365, 372 (1994).
20 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.

IV. AT THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE DOOR
Even if an attorney properly preserves all claims as suggested
above, the federal court may decide not to review these claims, but also
find them to be defaulted. Where the denial of a claim by a state's highest
court is based solely on adequate and independent state law grounds the
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concept of federalism instructs that the federal court refuse to review or
overtum the denial. 2 1 However, in order for the federal courts to utilize
this federalism doctrine, several conditions must first be satisfied.
The most important condition applicable to the "deathtrap" is that
the procedural
rule upon which the state court has relied upon must be
"adequate," 22 To be "adequate," the rule relied upon must have been in
effect at the time of its reliance, 23 must be clear and regularly followed
by the state court,24 must serve a state interest other than to preclude
federal review, 25 and must not violate due process or frustrate the review
26
of a fundamental right that can only be waived by that individual.
Further, because the comity and federalism doctrine is discretionary
and not jurisdictional, a federal court may still choose to hear a defaulted
claim.27 Generally, however, this authority will only be exercised if
petitioners can show cause for not asserting the claim earlier and
prejudice should the claim not be heard. 28 Courts may also overlook
such default, absent showings of cause and prejudice, if defendants have
made a showing that they are actually innocent of the crime or "innocent
ofthe death penalty." 29 These arguments and exceptions may be tailored
to the capital context in order to providepetitioners with specific grounds
for receiving relief from Virginia's procedural "deathtrap."
Whether the application of Rules 5:17(c) and 5:26 would satisfy
these conditions and provide a sufficient basis for federal courts to reach
the merits of claims purportedly defaulted has never been decided.
Therefore, in addition to making the effort to preserve substantive
claims, as described above, counsel should also challenge the constitutionality of applying these two rules. The arguments presented below are
30
suggested as grounds for making such a challenge.
1.

The lower court decisions refusing to grant the defendant relief from Rules 5:17(c) and 5:26 prevent counsel
from raising and preserving arguably meritorious
claims of error and thus deny the defendant effective
assistance of counsel as required by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The United States Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment requires that state courts provide indigent criminal defendants with
counsel.3 1 This right to counsel has long been interpreted as meaning
effective assistance of counsel. 32 This right to effective assistance of

21 Tools for the Ultimate Trial: The Tennessee Death Penalty
Defense Manual (prepared by the Capital Case Resource Center of
Tennessee) (3rd Edition 1992), Vol. 3, p. 21.7 (citing Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. at 86-87; Murray v. Carrier,477 U.S. 478,485(1986)).
22 Id. at p. 21.9.
23 Id. (citing Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 7 n.4 (1984)).
24 Id. (citingJohnson v. Mississippi,486 U.S. 578,587-89 (1988);
James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1984); and County Courtof
Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 40, 150-51 (1979)).
25 Id. (citingJames v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1984)).
26 Id. (citing Wainwrightv. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 92-94 (Burger, C..,
concurring); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,438-39 (1963)).
27 Id. at p. 21.7 (citing Smith v. Murray,477 U.S. 527,533 (1986)).
28 Id. at p. 21.10 (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90-91;
Murray v. Carrier,477 U.S. at 485).
29 See case summary ofSchlup v. Delo,Capital Defense Digest, this
issue (discussing standards applicable to various showings of innocence).
30 These arguments were first presented by the Public Defender for
the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida in a petition for a writ of
mandamus to the United States Supreme Court on behalf of the peti-

counsel is applicable not only to all criminal trials, but also to direct
appeals of right that are authorized by the individual states. 33 Counsel
is necessary during direct appeals because of the significant personal and
34
state interests at stake in the appellate process.
By comparison, the rights of a capital defendant on appeal should
warrant even stricter protections, since it is not merely an infringement
upon individual liberty that is at stake in a capital trial, but the loss of life.
By limiting the length of an appellate brief, and thus the scope of issues
that may be raised on appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia violates the
liberty interests of criminal defendants, preventing them from receiving
effective assistance of counsel. Further, where the length of an appellate
brief is limited by a court, these procedural rules effectively prevent
appellate counsel from fulfilling their professional responsibilities both
35
to their clients and the court.
2.

Virginia's procedural rules violate due process of law
because they do not provide defendants with a reasonable opportunity to present valid federal claims.

In Michel v. Louisiana36 and Parkerv. Illinois,37 the United States
Supreme Court discussed the validity of state procedural requirements
that were used as grounds for defaulting claims on subsequent federal
review. In Michel, the Supreme Court held that state courts were required
to provide defendants with "a reasonable opportunity to have the issues
as to [a] claimed right heard and determined by the state court."'38 In
Parker, the Court held that because the "channel through which the
constitutional questions" were to be raised was "clearly marked," "open
and unobstructed," the defendant was not entitled to relief.39 These
decisions suggest that as long as a state's procedural rules provide an
avenue through which defendants can pursue all of their claims, failure
to pursue those claims in such a fashion will be seen as valid grounds for
procedural default.
Contrary to these holdings, Virginia's strict adherence to its procedural rules regarding the briefing of appellate issues can prevent capital
defendants from raising all of their constitutional claims. In other words,
the rules themselves do not serve as a mechanism to channel federal
constitutional claims but rather filter them indiscriminately, by limiting
the space in which they may be raised. In doing so, these rules do not
provide the defendant with a "reasonable opportunity to have [their

tioner, William Duane Elledge. In re Elledge, Petition for Writ of
Mandamus, U.S. Supreme Court, October Term, 1990. While the
petition was denied, one of the Court's clerks did recommend that the
petition be granted, suggesting that the arguments might be favorably
received. PapersofJustice Marshall June 13, 1991 Conference List 2,
Sheet 5, p. 11 (Reproduced from the Collections of the Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress).
31 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
32 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
33 Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985)
34 See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 85 (1988) (quoting evitts v.
Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,396 (1985) ("In bringing an appeal as of right from
his conviction, a criminal defendant is attempting to demonstrate that the
conviction, with its consequent drastic loss of liberty, is unlawful."').
35 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
36 350 U.S. 91 (1955).
37 333 U.S. 571 (1948).
38 Michel, 350 U.S. at 93 (quoting Parker,333 U.S. at 574).
39 Parker,333 U.S. at 575.
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constitutional issues] heard and determined by the state court." 40 There41
fore, they violate the defendant's right to due process.
The Supreme Court's holding in Pennsylvania v. Finley42 offers
additional support for the argument that the procedures governing direct
state appeals must allow defendants the opportunity to raise and preserve
all meritorious issues. In Finley the Court held that the constitutional
right to counsel did not extend beyond the first appeal of right. 43
Therefore, Pennsylvania was not obligated to provide counsel for an
indigent defendant in a postconviction proceeding. 44 In distinguishing
between direct appeal and subsequent appeals, the Court relied on the
assumption that during the appeal of right, where counsel was constitu45
tionallymandated, all meritorious issues wouldberaised andresolved.
Thus, during any future challenges, the defendant would not need further
assistance of counsel since a complete record was already established
46
during the first appeal.
By effectively limiting the defendant's opportunity to develop such
a complete record on an appeal of right, the Virginia rules contradict the
implicit assumption of the Court in Finley.Thus, in Virginia, appellants
are denied meaningful access to the court during direct appeal because
they are prevented from litigating all of their claims of error. Further, any
subsequent reliance on this record may also prove to be incomplete. To
preserve the assumption made by the court in Finley when discussing the
role and necessity for counsel, Virginia must permit defendants to fully
litigate all meritorious issues during direct appeal.
3. Complete appellate review is necessary in order to
preserve the reliability of convictions, as required by procedural
due process, and to preserve meaningful review as required by
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
The United States Supreme Court has explicitly stated that "direct
appeal is the primary avenue for review of a conviction or sentence." 47
When such an appeal "comes to an end, a presumption of finality and
legality attaches to the conviction and sentence." 48 By preventing all
potential claims from being heard and decided on the merits, Virginia's
procedural rules render this presumption false and undermine the reliability of the appellate judgement. Thus, these rules violate the procedural due process rights of defendants in the Commonwealth.
According to the test set out inAke v. Oklahoma,4 9 Virginia should
not be permitted to adopt any procedural rules that prevent appellate

40 Michel, 350 U.S. at 93 (1955) (quoting Parker,333 U.S. at 574).
41 The Supreme Court has similarly struck other state procedures
that presented "unreasonable obstacles in the way of' defendants attempting to raise valid federal issues. See Davis v. Weeshler, 263 U.S.
22 (1923) (holding that defendant did not waive federal rights by
appearing at state court to litigate venue andjurisdictional issues, despite
state procedures holding to the contrary).
42 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
43 Id. at 555.
44 Id. at 554.
45 Id. at 557 (applying the Court's holding in Ross v. Moffitt, 417
U.S. 600, 614-15 (1974), to hold that the indigent defendant was
provided with meaningful access to the court, on discretionary review
through"the defendant's access to the trial
record and the appellate briefs
and opinions").
46 Id. at 557.
47 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983).
48 Id.
49 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
50 Id. See alsoLittle v. Streater,452 U.S. 1, 6 (1981); Mathews v.
Eldridge,424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

courts from fully reviewing all arguable errors in a capital case. In Ake,
the Court applied a three-part test to determine whether a state procedure
was required by procedural due process in order to protect the rights of
a criminal defendant. 50 The Court weighed the interests of the defendant
with those of the state in order to determine "the probable value of the
additional... safeguards... and the risk of ...
erroneous deprivation of
the affected interest" should those safeguards not be provided. 5 1
The Court continued by stating that when a defendant's life or
liberty are at stake, the "private interest in the accuracy of a criminal
proceeding ...is almost uniquely compelling."5 2 The state also has an
interest in ensuring the accuracy of criminal adjudications. While the
state may also have an interest in expediency 53 which would justify the
adoption of rules limiting the length of appellate briefs, ultimately these
interests must yield to those intended to protect the defendant and the
accuracy of the appellate adjudication.
InAke the Court balanced the interests of the state and the individual
defendant in order to determine whether an additional procedure was
required in order to safeguard the rights of that defendant. 54 In contrast,
in the context of the"deathtrap," theAke test may be applied to determine
whether Virginia's existing procedural rules should be suspended in
order to safeguard the interests of capital defendants. Similar to the state
interest identified in Ake, the Virginia rules could also be seen as
furthering the Commonwealth's desire for the expedient adjudication of
capital cases. 55 However, the Virginia rules potentially deprive defendants of the opportunity to raise colorable claims of error which could
overturn a capital conviction or sentence and thus save that defendant's
life. Noting the holding in Ake, it follows that a capital defendant's
interest in life and liberty coupled with the Commonwealth's interest in
the fair and accurate adjudication of cases should far outweigh any
interest the Commonwealth might have in maintaining expedient adjudications. Under such an analysis, procedural due process requires that
the Commonwealth be barred from applying the Virginia procedural
rules in capital cases.
V. CONCLUSION
The recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Virginia clearly
indicate that the court will continue to interpret Rules 5:17(c) and 5:26
strictly in order to default claims by capital defendants. To avoid losing

51 Ake, 470 U.S. at 77.
52 Id. at 78.
53 Under an appeal of right involving a capital sentence, the
Supreme Court of Virginia is required to review the complete trial record
to determine whether thejury's decision was arbitrary orprejudicial, and
whether it is proportional to the resulting sentences in other similar cases.
Va. CodeAnn. § 17-110 (1990). Bylimiting thelength ofappellatebriefs
and thus the number of meritorious issues the appellant can identify for
the court, the court must be more comprehensive in its review of the trial
court's record since arguably meritorious issues may exist that neither
party chose to identify. Without these restrictions, the court's independent review should be facilitated since presumably, defense counsel, in
the process of identifying all potentially meritorious issues, will also
identify many of the issues the court is required to identify. Therefore,
abandoning the rules that limit the length of appellate briefs will lead to
the more efficient adjudication of capital cases.
54 The indigent defendant inAke asserted a procedural right to have
access to a court-appointed psychological expert. Ake, 470 U.S. at 73.
55
The Supreme Court of Virginiahas never explicitly identified the
purpose of the procedural rules that comprise the "deathtrap" or theii
reasons for such strict enforcement.
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claims to the "deathtrap," defendants should first ask the state court to
exercise its discretion and provide relief from the rules ofthe "deathtrap."
Should this relief be denied, defendants must object to the enforcement
of these rules and list the particular claims that they will be prevented
from raising. Both the challenge to the Virginia rules and the reference
to particular claims at risk for default must be properly federalized.

Through these efforts, defendants may be able to preserve both their
substantive claims for future federal review and their challenge to the
validity of the Virginia rules themselves. When these claims, supported
by a clear record, are presented in the federal court system for review, it
is hoped that the federal courts will grant capital defendants the relief
from the "deathtrap" that the Supreme Court of Virginia refuses to
provide.

LEAVING NO STONE UNTURNED: ALTERNATIVE METHODS
OF DISCOVERY IN CAPITAL CASES
BY: TIMOTHY B. HEAVNER
The usual method of obtaining discovery in criminal cases in
Virginia is by motion under Rule 3A: 11 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of Virginia' and by motion for all exculpatory evidence in the
possession of the Commonwealth, according to the requirements of
Brady v. Maryland.2 This article will discuss other tools which may be
used in criminal discovery that are often overlooked and under-utilized
by defense attorneys.
It is important to start this discussion with two caveats. First, the
tools discussed in this article are not a substitute for the normal methods
of discovery, but may be used to supplement that discovery and provide
certain tactical advantages over these methods. Secondly, the use of all
these tools of discovery should not replace, but merely be a component
of a very thorough independent investigation by the defense of all of the
facts involved in the capital case.
I. SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM
A subpoena duces tecum is available under Rule 3A: 12 of the Rules
of the Supreme Court of Virginia "for the production of writings or
objects" that are "material to the proceedings and are in the possession
of a person not a party to the action." 3 It is normally easy to determine
what materials fit within the "writings and objects" requirement of this
rule, thus there is no case law on this point in Virginia. There also has been
little problem determining who is "a party to the action." 4 The most
litigated element of this rule is that documents that are sought be
"material to the proceedings." The leading case for determining materiality in the context of a subpoena duces tecum is Cox v. Commonwealth.5 In this case the defendant, the Treasurer of the City of Fairfax,
was charged with embezzlement and sought a subpoena duces tecum for
the production of certain documents from four banks which contained
information regarding the accounts of the City of Fairfax. The subpoena
was issued but a large percentage of the requested documents were not

I Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:11.
2 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
3 Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:12.
4 See Pattersonv. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 1, 348 S.E.2d 285,
290 (1986) (question was raised whether the objects requested by a
subpoena duces tecum were within the possession ofthe Commonwealth
or a third party, but it was not necessary to decide this issue).
5 227 Va. 324, 315 S.E.2d 228 (1984).
6 Cox v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 324, 326, 315 S.E.2d 228, 229
(1984). This right is established by Va. Const. art. I, § 8.
7 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).

provided to the defense by the banks. The defense then asked for a
continuance, but the trial court determined that the requested documents
were not "material."
On appeal Cox claimed that the lack of access to records material to
her defense denied her the right "to call for evidence in her favor as
guaranteed by the Constitution of Virginia." 6 The Supreme Court of
Virginia agreed and stated that this right applied to the procurement of
documentary evidence.
In response to the holding by the trial court that the documents
sought by the defendant were not material to her case, the court established the standard of materiality to be applied in these situations. The
court adopted the standard established by the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Agurs7 and Bowman Dairy Co. v. United
States,8 which requires that "a substantial basis for claiming materiality
exists" and that the materials in the hands of third parties "could be used
at trial." If the records sought meet both of these requirements, they are
the proper subject of a subpoena duces tecum. The court in Cox found that
the trial court had erred, that the records were material, and that "denying
the defendant access thereto violated her constitutional right 'to call for
evidence in [her] favor."' 9
The Virginia Court of Appeals has further defined the limits of this
standard. In Farish v. Commonwealth the court determined that a
subpoena duces tecum "should not be used when it is not intended to
produce evidentiary materials but is intended as a 'fishing expedition' in
the hope of uncovering information material to the defendant's case." t 0
In Gibbs v. Commonwealth the court clarified that the documents or
objects obtainable by a subpoena duces tecum are not limited to those
"that are admissible in evidence but may be issued for any writings or
objects that are 'material to the proceedings."' 11 The court's basis for
this decision rests on a person's constitutional right "to call for evidence
in his favor" 12 and the fact that this guarantee includes "the right to
prepare for trial which, in turn, includes the right to interview material

8 341 U.S. 214, 221 (1951).
9 Cox v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. at 328-29, 315 S.E.2d at
230-31.
10 2 Va. App. 627, 630, 346 S.E.2d 736, 738 (1986).
11 16 Va. App. 697, 698, 432 S.E.2d 514, 515 (1993).
12 Va. Const. art. I, § 8. It is critically important that objection to
a denial of a subpoena duces tecum also be made under the compulsory
process clause found in the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.

